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CORPORATIONS AND AGENCY

CORPORATIONS-COURT REJECTS THE

SEC

STANDARD

FOR IN-

CLUSION OF STATEMENTS IN PROXY SOLICITATIONS

Perhaps the most interesting corporate law case in Colorado
was decided in the Federal District Court. Western Oil Fields, Inc. v.
McKnab' dealt with the rights of a group of shareholders of an unlisted stock to include certain statements in a proxy solicitation. The
corporate management brought an action based on state law for
protective orders against a group of shareholders alleging that certain statements were included in proxy solicitations which were in
part "untrue, incomplete, misleading, full of innuendoes and the
same amount to either actual or constructive fraud made in conflict
and
with the fiduciary obligation to the other shareholders ....,,2
which may have deceived the other shareholders as to the true facts
surrounding the controversy. The management asked that the annual
meeting date be postponed, all proxy solicitations be cancelled, and
that the court restrain solicitation of proxies which do not relate
facts constituting a fair statement surrounding the matter. In denying the requested relief the district court, Arraj, J., said:
It is essential to the plaintiff's case that the accused statements
be significant and material, in the sense that they influenced or
reasonably could have influenced, shareholders to give their proxy
had the alleged
in a situation where they would not have done so
3
fraudulent statement or statements not been made.
No testimony was presented to indicate that anyone who had executed
a proxy had been misled. In addition, the court said that it would
be impossible for it to supervise further solicitations.
The Colorado Supreme Court has not expressed, as yet, an
opinion on this point but the rule adopted here is in line with the
cases on proxy solicitation decided in other states under state laws."
In re R. Hoe & Co. presents a statement of the judicial attitude"A certain amount of innuendo, misstatement, exaggeration and
puffing must be allowed as a natural by-product of a bitter camRId. at 163.
3 Id. at 166.

4Willoughby v. Post, 182 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified 277 F.2d 149
(2d Cir. 1960); Textron v. American Woolen Co., 122 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass.
1954); Mason v. Basic Properties, Inc., 230 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1962); DalTran Service Co. v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 14 App. Div. 2d 349, 220
N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Shora v. Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 205 N.Y.S.2d
98 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In re R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1954); In
re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
5
In re Hoe, supra note 4, at 147; see ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 435 (1957).
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paign. ' The attitude exemplified in these cases quite possibly is
an aspect of the old common law that is not easily forgotten.
The interesting aspect of Western Oil Fields is that, in the
attempt to determine the standard to govern proxy solicitation
statements for unlisted securities, the plainiffs cited many cases
dealing with Securities and Exchange Commission proxy rules, but
the court looked elsewhere for guidance.' Under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934' the Securities and Exchange Commission
was authorized to set certain standards for proxy solicitation for
unlisted securities. This authorization was implemented by section
14a of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules which does
establish a definite criterion for stockholder protection, but so far
this has not been extended beyond those persons listed in the regulation.8
Thus, Western Oil Fields is another example of the reluctance
of courts to adopt the standard established by the Securities and
Exchange Commission for proxy solicitation.'
Where do these decisions leave the investor? The considerations
of corporate democracy and adequate disclosure which fostered
enactment of this federal proxy regulation would certainly seem
to be applicable in protecting unlisted securities." The number of
investors holding unlisted securities is substantial" and these stockholders have no chance to take part in management or learn about
the conduct of management apart from the proxy.
The lack of measures to deal with the reluctance to provide
1232

F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1964).
6232 F. Supp. 162, 164; see Bresnick v. Home Title Guar. Co., 175 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) discussed in Standards of Disclosure in Proxy Solicitation of Unlisted Securities, 1960 DUKE L.J. 623, 635.
7 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(N) (1958).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2: "Sections 240.14a-1 to 24 0.14a-11 apply to every solicitation
of a proxy with respect to securities listed and registered on a national securities
exchange, whether or not trading in such securities has been suspended .... " These
rules have been extended beyond those securities listed on national exchanges but
the extension would not necessarily cover the situation in Western Oil Fields. For
a short summary of the operation of the Securities Exchange Commission proxy rules
see Hopper, The Securities and Exchange Commission as it Affects the General
Practitioner, 36 COLO. L. REv. 36, 60 (1963). For a study of the administration
of proxy rules see Mehren & McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the
Administration Process, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 728 (1964).

OThe opportunity to adopt this standard in state decisions has been presented to
other courts and summarily rejected, e.g., Bresnick v. Home Title Guar. Co., 175
F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

10See Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 226 (1940); 5 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA ON CORPORATIONS § 2052.1 p. 212 n. 64 (Revised volume 1952).
j'CCH

FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Report No. 902 p. 5 (5 June 1963).
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shareholders with some needed protection is indeed a gap in the
law, which should be filled legislatively or judicially. Colorado
has no statute. Other state statutes dealing with the matter are few
and generally not as comprehensive as the SEC laws." The solution,
at least for the present, would seem to lie with judicial recognition
of a state standard based on or equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission proxy rules-"one whose violation is most likely to shock the chancellor's conscience in any event-and thus obtain
the advantage of emancipation from whatever bothersome restrictions
may still surround traditional concepts of fraud in the particular
state.""
B.

CORPORATIONS-COMMON LAW CONCEPT OF FRAUD
ED AS THE
SALE

BASIS

FOR A CLAIM

Is

ADOPT-

FOR MISREPRESENTATION

IN

OF SECURITIES

Nichoalds v.McGlothen,"4 a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
case, dealt with fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. Nichoalds, who was the principal officer of two different corporations,
the Compass and Trilon corporations, was conducting financing
operations for Compass through Trilon. Loans were made by Trilon
for operating expenses of a ranch, located in Montana. This ranch
was an asset of Compass. Nichoalds, in advertising the Compass
property for sale at a price of $89,000, represented that Compass
had adequate money to pay all expenses. He also represented that
the listed encumbrances were the only ones outstanding against the
property. McGlothen, the plaintiff, offered $15,000 for a one-half
interest in the Compass Corporation, consisting of 8,000 shares of
stock, and was accepted. Thereafter, McGlothen learned that there
was an unlisted loan on the property and that certain assets of Compass were pledged to secure that loan. Then McGlothen learned
that Compass did not have sufficient cash to pay operating expenses.
He brought this action asking for a rescission of the agreement and
for a return of the purchase price and damages. In affirming the
district court decision granting the plaintiff's request for rescission,
Kerr, J., said for the Tenth Circuit: "We think the evidence and
legal principles support only one conclusion, namely, that Nichoalds
concealed from McGlothen material facts which equity and good
12 Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1960).

See J. I.

Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) where a federal court allowed a private
remedy based on a violation of rule 14 a; Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: the
Basis and Breadth of the Federal Remedy, 31 U. CHi.

L. REV. 328 (1964).

13 Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARv. L. REV.

14330 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1964).

1249, 1264 (1960).
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conscience required him to disclose fully and honestly . .""'. citing
Morrison v. Goodspeed.6 The court also indicated, alternatively,
that in the instant case the nondisclosure would be actionable notwithstanding a lack of intent to commit a fraud where the remedy
sought is rescission."
The application of Morrison to this set of facts to establish
fraud is well settled in Colorado, 8 and in itself is not particularly
noteworthy. However, a point of importance concerning this case
is that the plaintiff might have been able to base his claim under a
federal law.
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contains a provision
in section lob 9 controlling purchase and sale of securities. With
this basic provision the Securities and Exchange Commission has
enacted Rule X-10B-5, 0 which makes it unlawful to practice fraud
in the purchase and sale of securities in interstate commerce or on
national security exchanges. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.2 in
1946 held that a civil remedy is implied in this provision. Other
courts have indicated that the facts upon which an action may be
brought under section X-10B-5 have been liberalized compared to
those required at common law.22 In an action for damages under
X-10B-5, all the plaintiff need do is prove damage and a misstatement or omission of a material fact, and if he asks merely for rescission, he need not show damage.23
There has been some dispute in past cases concerning the extent
of the protection offered by X-10B-5. Some courts have limited
15 Id. at 457.
16 100 Colo. 470, 68 P.2d 458 (1937).
17 330 F.2d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1964) ; see the district court opinion at 212 F. Supp.
757, 761 (D. Colo. 1962).
I8 Bell Press, Inc. v. Phillips, 147 Colo. 461, 364 P.2d 398 (1961); Ginsberg v. Zaga,
126 Colo. 536, 251 P.2d 1080 (1952) ; cf. Leece v. Griffin, 150 Colo. 132, 371
P.2d 264 (1962).
1948 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1946).
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5: "It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
and sale of any security."
2169 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (on the
merits) ; 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (request for additional findings of fact
and law).
22See The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L. REV. 1120 (1950).

2 Id. at 1131, and cases cited therein.
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this protection to only those over-the-counter securities or listed securities traded on organized security markets.' However, by the
clear weight of authority the coverage is extended to any purchaser
of securities."5 There has also been some division of authority on
whether a civil liability could be created by a statute not containing
express provision for civil liability; however, Kardon and other
cases have inferred liability. 8
The last problem that McGlothen would encounter in bringing
an X-10B-5 suit would be to place the transaction in interstate commerce. Although the case does not discuss this point, it would seem
that because Compass was located in Montana and McGlothen
brought his action in Colorado, some interstate transaction occurred.
The courts have generally been very liberal in this regard so long as
the transaction was connected with interstate commerce. 7
C.

CORPORATIONS-RETURN RECEIPT FROM REGISTERED

LETTER

MUST BE RECEIVED BY SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A FOREIGN CORPORATION WILL
SATISFY DUE PROCESS

Leach v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co. ' is a federal district
court case which construed Colorado law pertaining to jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. Plaintiff Leach filed a motion with the
district court requesting an order allowing service of process on
defendant, a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in
24 The argument is based on the fact that the preamble to the Act of 1934 has language which could be inferred to so limit the coverage of X-10B-5. See 48 Stat.
881 § 2 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1946).
25
E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830 (D. Del. 1947).
26
Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Rosen v. Albern Color
Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp.
786, (S.D.W. Va. 1954). In Beury the court said:
The only reasonable construction of this statute (X-10B-5) is that it
confers exclusive civil jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain only those
actions which involve some right of recovery which goes beyond those common law rights which might have been fully adjudicated and enforced by
appropriate action in a state court . . . before the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 was passed. 127 F. Supp. at 790.
See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 635 (9th Cir. 1953), where, in citing 53
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 83(a) (1948) with approval, the court said:
"..
the phrase 'liability created by statute' or 'liability created by law' within the
meaning of such a statute, has been held not to include or extend to actions arising
under the common law." The law review article cited at note 22 supra raises some
additional objections to an action based on X-10B-5. For additional discussion and
some answers to those objections, see Securities Regulation-Civil Liability Under
Rule X-1OB-5 for Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of Securities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 893
(1954).
27 Fratt v. Robinson 203 F.2d 627 (9th. Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Il1. 1952).
282 3 1 F. Supp. 157 (D. Colo. 1964).
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Colorado, in accordance with Colo. Rev. Stat. §31-9-19(3) (1963)

.-

Service was made on the Secretary of State, and the defendant moved
to dismiss on the ground of denial of due process as guaranteed by
the Colorado and federal constitutions because of lack of notice.
The court first ruled that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"0 required only
a consideration of constitutionality under the Colorado constitution.'
In sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss, the court relied on a
Colorado case dealing with service of process on non-resident motorists, Clemens v. District Court. 2 Thus, the question to be dealt with
here is whether Clemens can be applied to Leach.

In Clemens, the Colorado Supreme Court was dealing with
the non-resident motorist statute3 which is identical to that for nonresident corporations in the requirement for the Secretary of State
to give notice to a prospective defendant. Both allow certification of
service after a registered letter is sent to the last known address of
the defendant, but require no return receipt before entry of a certificate of service. The court in Leach held the following language in
Clemens to compel its decision:
Here, proceeding under the statute, service was had on two
defendants; one received notice, the other did not. Though the
29 In the 1963 edition of COLO. REv. STAT.

§ 31-35-19(3) was changed to § 31-9-19(3):
(3)
If any foreign corporation shall hereafter transact business in the
state without having qualified to transact business, it shall be deemed
that such corporation has designated and appointed the secretary of state
as an agent for process upon whom may be served any process from a
court of record in any civil action arising out of any act or omission of
such corporation within this state. When any civil action is commenced, the
court upon verified motion giving the last known address of such corporation, and stating facts showing transaction of business within this state
may ex parte authorize service to be made upon the secretary of state.
Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process, complaint,
motion and order of court, with a fee of five dollars which shall be taxed
as part of the cost of the proceeding, to the secretary of state, his assistant,
or deputy. Notice of such service and a copy of each instrument so served
shall forthwith be sent by the secretary of state by registered mail addressed
to the defendant at its last known address with return receipt requested.
Promptly after such mailing the secretary of state shall file with the clerk
of the court a certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete
on the day the certificate is filed with the clerk of the court.
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31 231 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Colo. 1964). See COLO. CONST. art II, § 25, "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
32 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
33
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-3 (1963), formerly § 13-8-3 (1953):
Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process, complaint, motion and order of court to the secretary of state . . . .Notice of
such service and a copy of each instrument so served shall forthwith be sent
to the secretary of state by certified or registered mail, addressed to the
defendant at his address given in the order of court, with return receipt
requested. Promptly after such mailing the secretary of state shall file with
the clerk of the court a certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be
complete thirty days after service of process on the secretary of state as provided in this section.
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effectiveness of procedures prescribed for getting notice to defendants should not be finally adjudged on results attained in an isolated
case, the result here attained does cast grave doubt on the effectiveness of the methods provided and pursued.
Procedures only fifty percent effective cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring notice to the defendant or to constitute
34
due process.

In arriving at the Clemens decision the Colorado court relied
on both federal and state concepts of the requirements of due pro35
cess.
The general rule on requirement of notice to satisfy due process
was stated in Hess v. Pawlosk3 and has been interpreted to mean

that such service must be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action against him. 7 The cases have not been in accord as to what can be interpreted as reasonable notification as to
both non-resident motorists and to foreign corporations;3" however
a case decided in the Federal District Court of Maryland, Speir v.
Robert C. Herd & Co.,3" offers a compelling analysis.

In Speir the defendant corporation challenged the validity of
service of process made under a Maryland statute which required
that a registered letter be sent to defendant, but did not require a
34

Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917);
Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 (1930) ; Kurilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213,
38 A.2d 862 (1944).
36 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
37
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75 (Tent. Draft no. 3, 1956):
Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. A state cannot exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person, who is subject to its jurisdiction, unless a reasonable
method of notification is employed and unless he is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. Comment: e. Actual knowledge of proceedings
not required. It is not necessary that the defendant should have received
actual knowledge of the action in which the judgment is rendered. It is
sufficient that the steps taken to give him notice of the action and an
opportunity to be heard satisfy the requirements of the rule of this section.
38 Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944)
(statute required return receipt,
held valid); Clawson v. Central Nebraska Packing Co., 219 F.Supp. 1 (D. Ind.
1963); Kohler v. Derderian, 187 F.Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Allison v. Montgomery Ward, 159 F.Supp. 550 (D.N.H. 1957); Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F.Supp.
62 (D. Mont. 1957); Powell v. Knight, 74 F.Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947); Harrison
v. Matthews, 235 Ark. 915, 362 S.W.2d 704 (1962) ; Boise Flying Serv. v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 Idaho 5, 36 P.2d 813 (1934) ; Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York v. Cross, 127 Miss. 31, 89 So. 780 (1921) (dealing with an insurance company) ; Levitt v. Colonial Boat Works, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 555, 176 A.2d
48 (1961); National Mfg. Corp. v. Buffalo Metal Container Corp., 204 Misc. 269,
126 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1953) ; State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 So. C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242
(1946). Cf., Maston v. Desormeau Dairy-Vend Serv., Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 860,
203 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1960); Parr v. Leal, 290 S.W.2d 536 (C.C.A. Tex. 1956).
39189 F.Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960). See Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 221 F.Supp.
253 (D. Md. 1963) ; Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Shaffer Stores Co., 240 F.Supp. 775,
785 (D. Md. 1965) (where the court rejects Leach).
35
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return receipt."0 The defendant argued that due process was not
satisfied without the requirement of a return receipt, as evidenced
by the non-resident motorist statutes in effect in Maryland which
did require the receipt. The court rejected the defendant's argument
and held the statute to be valid. It relied on several cases, including
some cited in Clemens, for the point that a corporation is not the
same as a non-resident individual. The court generally followed
the theory that a corporation should be aware of the statutory requirements of a state in which it does business and should keep current a certification of its address so that, in the event an action is
brought against it, notification will occur. 4 The possibility that the
address of the corporation may be unknown should not affect validity, because lack of an address is the exceptional case and constitutionality is decided on the basis of normal circumstances.42
40

§ 96(d) (1957):
If any corporation of this state, or any foreign corporation required by any
statute of this state to have a resident agent or any foreign corporation
subject to suit in this state under § 92 of this article (1) has not a resident
agent, . . . such corporation shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Commission as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept on
its behalf service of process.
ANN. CODE OF MARYLAND art. 23 § 98 (1957):
When service of process upon any corporation of this state or upon any
foreign corporation is made by leaving copies of the process in the office
of the Commission as provided in this subtitle:
(a) In general-It shall be the duty of the Commission forthwith to
record the day and hour of such service and to forward by registered
mail one copy of the process with a notice of such service, addressed
to such corporation at its mailing address, if it has a mailing address,
if it has a mailing address on file with the Commission, or if it has not
a mailing address on file with the Commission, addressed to it at its
principal office, if it has a principal office, or, if it has neither a mailing address on file with the Commission nor a principal office, addressed to it in care of the secretary of state or the corresponding
official of the state or place under the statute or common law of which
it was formed or is existing, if known to the Commission: and

ANN. CODE OF MARYLAND art. 23

(b) ....
41 189 F.Supp. at 435.

42

The Speir court cited Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 20
(1927):
The cases, in which statutes have been upheld providing that nonresident
corporations may properly be served by leaving a summons with a state
official, where the corporation has not indicated a resident agent to be
served, are not especially applicable to the present statute . . . .Such corporations may be properly required to accept service through a public officer
as a condition of their doing business in the state. Their knowledge of the
statutory requirement may perhaps prompt frequent inquiry as to suits
against them... ;
and Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 (1930) for the proposition that
"A foreign corporation is expected to protect itself by keeping up to date
the certification of its mailing address."
Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F.Supp. 432, 435 (D. Md. 1960). American
Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911), "The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals."
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On the basis of the comparison of Leach and Speir, it would seem
that the Colorado Federal District Court has made an unnecessary
extension of the requirements of due process for service of process
on foreign corporations. 3
D.

CORPORATIONS-SALES IN THE STATE BY A LOCAL DISTRIBUTOR
OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION AMOUNT TO DOING BUSINESS IN

THE STATE

The case of American Type Founders Co. v. District Court of
the City and County of Denver," decided in the Colorado Supreme
Court prior to both Leach and Clemens, questioned the application
of the statute' which was declared void in Leach. American Type
Founders, a foreign corporation, had sold some printing equipment
through a local distributor who was located in Denver. Suit was
brought against American Type Founders for breach of this contract. The same statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-19(3) (1963), was
used to obtain service of process. Founders filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the corporation was not,
in fact, transacting business without having qualified to transact
business as provided by the statute.4 The supreme court affirmed
the district court's denial of the motion. In so holding, the supreme
court reaffirmed the long-established precedent that the requirements of this statute are "doing business" in the state.' 7 As authority
for this point, the court has continually relied on InternationalShoe
Co. v. State of Washington." American Type Founders is of inter43The Speir case must be distinguished from cases similar to State of Washington v.
Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 366 (1933), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that did not require notice to be sent to a foreign corporation
saying:
the fact that appellant qualified to do business in the state and complied
with the registration statute also distinguishes cases of attempted service
on a state official pursuant to a statute with which the defendant corporation had never complied, and where at the time of suit it had removed from
the state and was transacting no business.
In Leach and Speir neither defendant corporation had complied with the state statutes,
the former not having qualified to do business, the latter having not made a proper
appointment of an agent.
389 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1964).
45 COLO. REV.STAT. § 31-9-19(3) (1963).
46

Ibid.

7

4' Bay Aviation Serv. Co. v. District Court, 149 Colo. 542, 370 P.2d 752 (1962);
Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 147 Colo. 436, 364 P.2d 866 (1961); Hibbard,

Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. District Court, 138 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d 208 (1958).
Compare Focht v. Southwestern Skyways, Inc., 220 F.Supp. 441 (D. Colo. 1963),
a!f'd in Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Focht, 336 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964).
48326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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est, recalling that it preceded the Clemens and Leach decisions, because of the definite possibility that the next time the supreme court
is presented with this problem it may declare the statute void, on the
strength of Leach. 9
E.

AGENCY-INSURERS

OWE

No DUTY

TO THEIR AGENTS TO ACT

WITH CARE TO PREVENT LAPSE OF INSURANCE

POLICIES IN

WHICH THE AGENT HAS AN INTEREST

In Berenbeim v. Maccabees,s" the court ruled on the question
of the duty of an insurer with respect to commissions due its agents
on renewals of insurance policies.
Plaintiff Berenbeim was a district manager for the defendant
insurer and in the course of his employment he wrote insurance
policies for various individuals. Berenbeim's contract provided that
he was to have 'certain vested commissions upon termination
of employment. Those commissions were a percentage of the premiums paid by the policyholders . . .,""'regardless of whether he was

currently employed by defendant Maccabees. Berenbeim was terminated for cause and he brought this action contending, in part, that
Maccabees "negligently, carelessly and recklessly failed to send out

notices of premiums due, failed to take proper steps to keep policies
of insurance in force in which the plaintiff had an interest.'52 The
trial court sustained Maccabees' motion for a summary judgment. On
appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. Moore, J., said on
this point, quoting the assertion of Maccabees, "defendant had and
49

50
51
52

If the Colorado Supreme Court does overrule American Type Founders, the enactment of a new statute would obviously be necessary. Of important consideration in
this regard is the fact that Colorado has seen fit only to enact a "doing business"
statute. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) indicate that
a state may enact "minimum contacts" statute which would considerably extend the
state's power to obtain personam jurisdiction. In light of the fact that in Clemens
v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964), the court saw fit to place emphasis on
the minimum contacts basis it is suggested that Colorado place itself among those
states which have extended the embrace of jurisdiction without violating due process.
See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process clause and the in Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: a Review, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569 (1958). See Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 119 in which CoLo. REV. STAT.
37-1-26, -27 (1963) was enacted providing a method of service of process of foreign
corporations requiring personal service. Effective date is May 10, 1965. And see Colo.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 109 in which COLO. REV. STAT. 31-9-19(3) was amended to
require return receipt.
392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
Brief for Defendant, pp. 19-20, Berenbeim v. Maccabees, 392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
392 P.2d at 173 '(Colo. 1964).
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has no duty toward plaintiff with respect to the manner in which
53
defendant conducts its own business.
The case presents an interesting question concerning the rights
of an insurance agent to commissions on renewals of policies which
he has previously written. More specifically, can an employer negligently and recklessly act to deprive his employee of this right?
This specific point had not been considered in Colorado prior to
this time.
The general rule with respect to commissions on renewals is
that they must be provided for by the express terms of the contract
including the right to renewals on termination of employment; the
employee's rights to these commissions will not be found to be
merely implied. 4 On this point Berenbeim qualified because of the
express provision in his contract, but failed in his claim because the
company had no duty to secure renewals of the policies. With no
renewals, there could be no commissions.
53
54

Id.at 174.
Aronoff v. Carraher, 146 Colo. 223, 361 P.2d 354 (1961), citing Corpus Juris
Secundum with approval said:
A renewal agreement whereby a contract of insurance may be continued in
force after its expiration, is in itself a contract of insurance. It has been
generally held that a renewal is in effect a new contract of insurance, for
the period of time covered by such renewal, at least in the sense that it is
subject to the laws in force at the time it is effected, and at least where there
is no provision in the original policy for its renewal. 146 Colo. at 228.
Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 100 Colo. 398,
68 P.2d 555 (1937), citing Corpus Juris with approval saying:
A renewal of a fidelity policy or bond constitutes a separate and distinct
contract, for the period of time covered by such renewal, unless it appears
to be the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the provisions thereof,
that such policy or bond and the renewal thereof shall constitute one continuous contract. 100 Colo. at 401.
Pruitt v. Southern Underwriters, 83 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1955), "the agent has no vested
rights in commissions on renewal premiums . . . and his right to be paid commissions on renewals must be based entirely upon the terms of the contract;" Barr v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 200 So. 240 (Fla. 1941):
ITlhe great weight of authority holds that the agent has no vested rights
in commissions on renewal premiums and that his right to be paid commissions on renewal premiums must be based entirely upon the terms of the
contract and even where a contract provides for commissions on renewal
premiums the contract is construed to require the payment of such commissions only as long as the employee continues as the agent of the company
and, unless otherwise provided in the contract, he is entitled to no commissions on renewals made after the termination of his employment as Agent.
200 So. at 243.
Stevenson v. Brotherhoods Mut. Benefit, 317 Mich. 575, 27 N.W.2d 104 (1947):
"'T]he right of an insurance agent to commissions on renewal premiums depends upon
the contract existing between the agent and the insurance company."; Cortina v.
General Ins. Co. of America, 40 Misc. 2d 916, 244 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1963) ; Underwood v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 161 N.Y. 413, 55 N.E. 936 (1900); 4 COUCH,
INSURANCE § 26:400-11 (2d ed. 1960).
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The contentions of the parties would be easily solved had the
contract required Maccabees to obtain renewals, for there is ample
authority to support an action based on negligence when there is a
duty involved.55 However, in insurance contracts as between the insured and insurer, the general rule is that unless the contract contains an express provision for such renewal, it terminates on expiration of the period of the original conract, " and before there is renewed coverage a new contract must be agreed upon. The cases do
not speak of a duty upon the insurer actually to attempt to obtain a
renewal; in fact, in Berenbeim it appeared that the insurance agentBerenbeim himself, if still employed-had the duty to obtain the
renewal. 7
Notwithstanding the fact that there might not have been a duty
on the part of the insurance company to obtain renewals, there is
at least one decision which indicates the insurance agent may maintain an action for relief for a lapse caused by the insurer.58 The best
55Lembke Plumbing and Heating v. Hayutin, 148 Colo. 334, 366 P.2d 673 (1961),
(Defendant negligently installed some pipes which broke, causing damage to plaintiff's house. The contract imposed no duty to use care, however, "the duty upon
Lembke was even more fundamental, to-wit: the common law obligation to exercise
due care, caution and skill resting on all persons and in all undertakings when the
rights of others are involved. Although this duty may not be contractual, the law
allows no vacuum and imposes the duty." 148 Colo. at 337) ; Dean v. Hershowitz,
119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262, 266 (1953) (A duty arises where "in the performance of some act within the scope of that relationship, unless he uses proper care,
is likely to do injury to the person, property, or rights of the other.") ; Douglas v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 At!. 708, 711 (1924) (So far as
an obligation to use care is concerned, it is imposed by law upon all who undertake
a service) ; Burnham v. Stillings, 76 N.H. 122, 79 Atl. 987 (1911) (It is not usual
to express this duty in the contract.); Lewis v. Scott, 54 Wash. 2d 851, 341 P.2d
488 (1959) ; 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 20 p. 662 (1941):
Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with
care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be
done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort,
as well as a breach of contract. In such a case, the contract is mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort.
In other words, the contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty
to use care.
5
6 Metts v. Central Standard Life Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 445, 298 P.2d 621 (1956);
Rosin v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 116 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1960) ; McGregor v. Interocean Ins. Co., 48 Wash. 2d 268, 292 P.2d 1054 (1956). Compare Hutchinson
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1956).
57 Brief for Defendant, pp. 20-21, Berenbeim v. Maccabees, 392 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1964).
58 Hahn v. North American Life Ins. Co., 13 Hun. 195 (N.Y. 1878). Plaintiff was
employed by defendant as a general agent to solicit insurance and collect premiums.
The agreement provided that he was to receive compensation on premiums, regardless
of whether or not he continued working for the company, so long as they should be
paid to the company. Plaintiff claims damages caused by the defendant in processing
policies obtained by the plaintiff to be transferred to other companies, or causing
them to lapse, thus depriving the plaintiff of his right to commissions upon renewal
premiums. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover on those policies which the
defendant caused to be transferred or lapse.
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expression on the point is in Ensign v. United Pac. Ins. Co.59 where
the court stated in a strong dictum that an agent could recover commissions lost by an arbitrary cancellation of a policy by the insurer.
This dictum was quoted with approval in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in deciding an appeal from a Colorado
Federal District Court case, Sterling ColoradoAgency, Inc. v. Sterling
Ins. Co. " Sterling suggests that facts sufficient to evidence bad faith
on the part of the insurer toward the insurance agent would be adequate to give the agent a claim for renewals lost."1
F.

AGENCY-SERVANT RETURNING FROM A MEAL WHILE TRAVELING FOR
OF

His

His

MASTER IS DOING AN ACT WITHIN THE SCOPE

EMPLOYMENT

Hynes v. Donaldson,62 decided in the Colorado Supreme Court,
presents an interesting determination of the extent of "scope of employment" with respect to agents while traveling for their principals.
Donaldson was an employee of the defendant corporation and had
served for several years in the New Mexico area. On trips out of
town he was paid a per diem plus mileage. In 1959 Donaldson was
advised of his impending transfer to the corporation's Denver office
and, to enable him to make an easier transition, he was directed to
go to Denver and discuss prospective business, familiarize himself
59 107 Utah 557, 155 P.2d 965 (1945). Plaintiffs were non-exclusive agents of the
defendant, employed to solicit and submit applications for insurance on various
classes of risks. Plaintiff had earlier written a policy of insurance with A and now
A desiring a new rate, because of changed conditions, contacted a broker who in turn
contacted plaintiff. The insured had desired to get the coverage immediately, but
plaintiff was slow in acting, therefore the defendant wrote the policy through
another agent.
In holding for the defendant, the court said:
Respondent (defendant] could not, of course, by arbitrary action cancel the
policy with the object of preventing the collection of premiums by plaintiffs and securing thereby an advantage to itself. Nor, . . . could it arbitrarily refuse quotation to an agent of a proper rate and secure the insurance through another at such rate, at least where the business contact with
the insured had been originally made by the agent. To do so would
evidence a lack of fair dealing which would deprive appellants of the
contemplated fruits of their contract with respondent. But neither may the
agent through lack of diligence on his part chance the loss of such business
by the insurer and still be entitled to the benefits accruing as a result of
the diligence of another. This is precisely what appellants demand. 155
P.2d at 967. (Emphasis added.)
Ensign was quoted with approval in Sterling Colo. Agency, Inc. v. Sterling Ins. Co.,
266 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1959) where the court said:
It is true that an insurer cannot by arbitrary action cancel a policy to prevent collection of renewal premiums by the agent . . . ; or to force the
agent to accede to improper demands, . . . or otherwise interfere in business
which it has promised the agent in order to defeat his rights. Such activities
have been found to be violative of the implied covenant of good faith between principal and agent. 266 F.2d at 474.
60 266 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1959).
61
Id. at 474.
62 395 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1964).
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with the area, and search for a home for his family. When he arrived in Denver he was housed in a motel which had been rented
for him by the defendant corporation. The day on which the accident in question occurred Donaldson breakfasted with an official
of the corporation and then spent some time looking for a house.
That evening he dined with a corporate official and discussed corporate business. On the way back to his motel, an automobile accident occurred in which he injured the plaintiff, Hynes. Hynes
brought this action against the corporation, Donaldson's principal.
The trial court granted defendant corporation's motion for summary
judgment but the supreme court, in an opinion by Frantz, J., reversed,
holding that:
An employee who, in following his master's instructions, is
away from home or the headquarters of his employment ...

which

makes it impossible to return home each night must of necessity eat
and sleep in various places to carry on the business of his master.

Under the circumstances we hold that a servant while lodging in a
public accommodation, preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal,
is performing an act necessarily incident to his
3

employment.6
Finally, the court held that whether the facts of this case brought
Donaldson within this rule was a jury question.
The basis of affixing liability on the master for the acts of his
servant is the doctrine of respondeat superior. The master is liable
when he has placed his servant, over whom he has the right to control, in such a position as to cause injury to third parties.64 The periods during which the master has this right to control and direct the
agent are said to be within the "scope of employment."" In addition,
the courts have extended liability for acts of the servant which are
incidental to the scope of employment, those acts which the master
could have reasonably anticipated as probable in view of the terms
of the employment." Colorado has generally recognized these principles as evidenced by the cases cited in Hynes.67
Id. at 223.
64Foerker v. Nicholson, 41 Colo. 12, 92 Pac. 224 (1907), The court quotes Quarman
63

v. Burnett, 6 M W 497, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (Ex. 1840):
[Tihe master is responsible for the acts of his servant; and that person is
undoubtedly liable, who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer he who had selected him as his servant, from the knowledge of or belief in
his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose
orders he was bound to receive and obey; ... 41 Colo. at 13.
65 Id.

6 Miller v. Teche Lines, Inc., 175 Miss. 351, 167 So. 52 (1936).
A case in which an action
was brought when an alleged agent shot and killed the plaintiff's husband as he
trespassed on defendant's land. However, no employment was shown between defendants and the alleged agent, even though the land did belong to these defendants.

67 Sayers v. Nuckolls, 3 Colo. App. 95, 32 Pac. 187 (1893).
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The issue presented in Hynes was whether the accident occurred
at a time when Donaldson's acts were within the master's right to
control him either directly or incidentally. The question here is particularly difficult because on the day in which the accident occurred
Donaldson was looking for a possible residence for his family in
the event he was moved to Denver. Granted, Donaldson was in Denver by order of his master, but it would seem that at least while
Donaldson was looking for a home he was beyond the scope of
employment.8
The difficulty arises because in support of its decision, the court
places much emphasis on the fact that the accident occurred after
Donaldson had eaten his evening meal, citing three travelling salesIn denying the plaintiff relief the court annouced the rule that "there must be an
relation of master and servant must exist; that the wrong of the
employment -the
servant was incidental to or in the line of his employment and within the authority
given." 3 Colo. App. at 102. The wrong committed was not an incident to the
employment but the criminal act of a confederate; In Cooley v. Essridge, 125 Colo.
102, 241 P.2d 851 (1952), the defendant employer was doing some construction
work and had entered into a contract with the plaintiff whereby the latter agreed
to furnish equipment and operators, and pay all expenses of his operation. Defendant also hired one Berglin to see that dirt was deposited correctly and see that
plaintiff did his work. Subsequently Berglin was employed by the plaintiff to put
in some overtime; the wages for this period were to be paid by plaintiff. On the
day the accident occurred one of plaintiff's operators didn't appear. Berglin didn't
contact the defendant but employed one Ferrel to help with some machinery. Ferrel
drove the machine up a hill and due to his acts it was damaged.
In denying plaintiff a recovery the court said:
There is no competent evidence in the record to support a finding that
Berglin was acting within the scope of his employment when he undertook
the matters of which the complaint is here made resulting in plaintiff's
damages. The things which Berglin undertook to do were not for Edna's
(defendant's) benefit but for plaintiffs advantage, and were matters which
were exclusively for plaintiffs benefit. They amounted to a wilful trespass
and were unlawful; and, as we have said, Edna '(defendant) is not liable
therefor in the absence of express authorization. 125 Colo. at 114. (Emphasis added.)
Gibson v. Dupree, 26 Colo. App. 324, 144 Pac. 1133 (1914), was a case where
the plaintiff, while riding a bicycle, was struck by an auto driven by N. The auto
was kept by the employers of N subject to a bailment for E. N had been forbidden
to take any auto out of the garage except upon call of the owner. The accident
occurred while N was returning from having a battery charged. Caring for batteries
was a part of his duties but he had no authority to use the auto. In holding the
employers liable for N's tort the court said: "Such disobedience in using the automobile for such purpose has relation merely to the manner in which the act (going
and returning with the battery) was performed. The masters are liable for injury
caused by the disobedience of the servant in so using the automobile." 26 Colo.
App. at 328.
68Admittedly this house-hunting occurred while Donaldson was employed by the
defendant but there was no control exercised by defendant nor was there benefit to
him apart from the fact that Donaldson's family would have a place to live upon
arrival in Denver. For cases holding this activity beyond the scope of employment
see Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Howard, 129 Colo. 262, 269 P.2d 701 (1954) ; Cooley
v. Essridge, 125 Colo. 102, 241 P.2d 851 (1952); Marron v. Helmecke, 100 Colo.
364, 67 P.2d 1034 (1937) ; see Tregellas v. American Oil Co., 188 A.2d 691 (Md.
1963); Porter v. Jack's Cookie Co., 106 Ga. App. 497, 127 S.E.2d 313 (1962);
McClean v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 3 Ill. App. 2d 235, 121 N.E.2d 337 (1954);
Loos v. Boston Shoe Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 564, 266 P.2d 884 (1954) ; SEAVEY, LAW
OF AGENCY § 83B (1964), "It is only during the period in which the servant has
duties that the employer is liable for his unauthorized conduct." At p. 141.
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men cases as authority for the point that the meal was incidental to
the scope of employment."9 But in each one of these cases the travelling salesman had caused some injury, either while performing or
after having performed a service for his master. In Hynes, Donaldson
was eating a meal after having performed an act for himself and apparently on a day during which he could look for a home. It may
be argued that the dinner was eaten with an official of the defendant
corporation, but the court does not limit the decision to that set of
facts." The apparent basis of the holding of the case is the sole fact
that a meal was eaten while Donaldson was in Denver by order of
the master. 7 But, as illustrated in the travelling salesmen cases, the
meal must be related to some act done for the master. This decision
is puzzling because surely the court does not mean that any meal
that Donaldson eats while in Denver is incidental to his employment,
but the import of the court's words would seemingly lead to that
conclusion.
This decision should be limited to the facts of this case because
an adoption of a liberal interpretation of Hynes will bring an unreasonable broadening of the scope-of-employment concept.
In 1964 there were no partnership cases interpreting Colorado
law which would require a discussion in this review.
William E. Brayshaw
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Brunk v. Hamilton, 334 Mo. 517, 66 S.W.2d 903 (1933). In this case defendant's
agent was a travelling salesman employed to procure sales over a large area. He
fixed his own hours. On the day the accident occurred, the agent was driving a
company car, he had left his base to sell various products and on the return he
stopped at one town to have dinner. After dinner and on the way back to his base
the accident happened. Defendant argued that the agent was no longer working for
him when the accident occurred. In rejecting the defendant's argument the court
said: "Such activities or suspensions of activity are necessary concomitants of the
employment." 66 S.W.2d at 907. The court also dealt with the question of stopping
for dinner as being within the scope of employment, saying: "Cessation of work
for eating, drinking, and other like necessities are necessary incidents of employment,
and an employee so engaged does not sever his relation from his work, nor does he
do so by going to or from his places of work."; 66 S.W.2d at 907. Ryan v. Farrell,
208 Cal. 200, 280 Pac. 945 (1929): Here the agent was also a travelling salesman
who had gone into his territory to solicit some customers for his master, the defendant Rex. On the return trip he injured the plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to a new trial the court said: "An employee who has gone on an errand
on behalf of his master does not cease to be acting in the course of his employment
at the moment he starts upon the return trip after having performed the errand."
280 Pac. at 946; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703, 271 Pac. 789 (1928), on identical
facts with the Ryan case, discussed above, the court said, in holding the agent's acts
were within the scope of employment, "it being sufficient . . . that he was engaged
in acts contributing to the service .... " 271 Pac. at 794.
70
Hynes v. Donaldson, 395 P.2d 221, 223 (Colo. 1964), "[P]reparing to eat or
returning from a meal .... "
7' Cunningham v. Union Chevrolet Co., 177 Tenn. 214, 147 S.W.2d 746 (1941). The
mere fact that the injury complained of was caused by negligence of the servant in
the performance of an act which, taken per se, was within the scope of his employment, will not impose a liability upon the matter, if the act was merely incidental
to the servant's attempt to perform an act entirely beyond the scope of his authority.

